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Village-level aggregate shocks such as droughts and ﬂoods cannot be perfectly insured 
by risk sharing within a village.  Then,  what type of households are more vulnerable 
in terms of a decline in consumption when a village is hit by such natural disasters? 
This question is investigated in this study by using two-period panel data for the years 
2001 and 2004 from rural Pakistan.  We propose a methodology to infer the theoretical 
mechanisms underlying the heterogeneity of households in terms of their vulnerability, 
and  focus  on  the  diﬀerence  between  the  across-household-type  diﬀerence  in  marginal 
response to aggregate shocks and that in marginal response to idiosyncratic shocks. The 
empirical results obtained indicate that the sensitivity of consumption changes to shocks 
diﬀers across household types, depending on the type of natural disasters.  Moreover, 
land and credit access are eﬀective in mitigating the ill-eﬀects of various types of shocks. 
Household  heads who are  educated or elderly  and households with  a greater  number 
of working members bear a larger burden of the village-level shocks; however, they are 
not vulnerable to idiosyncratic health shocks.  It is revealed that these patterns may be 
explained by the coexistence of unequal access to credit markets and risk sharing among 
heterogeneous households in terms of risk tolerance. 
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11  Introduction
 
In addressing the issue of poverty in developing countries, due consideration must be given 
to the vulnerability of households to natural disasters. Poor households are likely to suﬀer in 
terms of not only low levels of income and consumption on average but also from ﬂuctuations 
in  their  income  and  consumption  in  the  face  of  natural  disasters.  Such  households  are 
vulnerable to a decline in their welfare level because they are subject to substantial shocks, 
such  as  weather  variability,  and  have  limited  ability  to  cope  with  such  shocks  (Dercon, 
2005;  Fafchamps,  2003).  These  conditions  of  poor  households  have  led  to  an  emerging 
literature on vulnerability measures in development economics (Ligon and Schechter, 2003; 
2004; Kamanou and Morduch, 2005; Calvo and Dercon, 2005; Kurosaki, 2006a).  According 
to these studies, poor people are considered to be vulnerable to shocks when (i) they cannot 
mitigate income volatility and (ii) their consumption expenditure is volatile over time (they 
lack reliable coping mechanisms). 
Economic development  in South Asia has  been characterized  by moderate success in 
economic growth and substantial failure in human development in relation to aspects such 
as basic health, education, and gender equality (Dr` eze and Sen, 1995). This characteristic is 
most apparent in Pakistan (World Bank, 2002). In July-August 2010, Pakistan experienced 
“the worst ﬂoods in its history... The ﬂoods have aﬀected 84 districts out of a total 121 dis­
tricts in Pakistan, and more than 20 million people — one-tenth of Pakistan’s population... 
More than 1,700 men,  women  and children have  lost their lives,  and at least 1.8 million 
homes have been damaged or destroyed” (UN 2010, p.1).  In this paper, the case of Pak­
istan is examined as an example of low-income countries subject to such natural disasters. 
Although the overall  economic growth  rates had improved  during  the 2000s in Pakistan, 
poverty reduction  was slower  than expected.  Using a two-period panel dataset spanning 
three years from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP),1 one of the four provinces that 
comprise Pakistan, Kurosaki (2006a) and Kurosaki (2006b) indicated that rural households 
were indeed vulnerable to substantial welfare ﬂuctuations.  In addition, using a three-year 
panel dataset from Pakistan’s Punjab, Kurosaki (1998) showed that farmers’ consumption 
was  excessively  sensitive  to idiosyncratic  shocks that  hit their non-farm income.  Similar 
ﬁndings  have  been  reported  for  other  South  Asian  countries  under  agronomic  conditions 
that are comparable to those of Pakistan, such as villages in the Deccan Plateau in India 
(Townsend, 1994; Kurosaki, 2001). 
One shortcoming of existing literature is its focus on the welfare impacts of idiosyncratic 
1In April 2010, the constitution of Pakistan was amended and the former NWFP was renamed “Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa.” In this paper, since all data correspond to a period before this constitutional amendment, 
the expression “NWFP” is used to refer to the current province of “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.” 
2shocks, such as loss due to theft or accidental injury. Such shocks imply that the experience 
of a particular household is diﬀerent from and independent of other households.  This focus 
has led to econometric speciﬁcations in which all village-level shocks are often controlled 
through ﬁxed-eﬀects, without fully analyzing information on the village-level co-movement 
of income and consumption. This is unsatisfactory, particularly when considering the grow­
ing inﬂuence of aggregate shocks on the welfare of villagers in the process of globalization 
and global  warming.  According  to Sawada  (2007),  the impact  of idiosyncratic  risks and 
nondiversiﬁable aggregate risks that characterize a disaster are distinctively diﬀerent, and 
the role of self-insurance becomes more important against large-scale disasters because for­
mal or informal mutual insurance mechanisms are largely ineﬀective.  However, research on 
the heterogeneity of the impact of natural disasters on household welfare and the economic 
mechanism underlying the heterogeneity is lacking. 
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap in the literature by investigating the following ques­
tion:  Which type of households in rural Pakistan are more vulnerable to natural disasters 
such as ﬂoods and droughts in terms of a decline in their consumption during such disas­
ters?  In order to infer the microeconomic mechanisms underlying the heterogeneity of this 
vulnerability, this paper proposes a methodology that focuses on the diﬀerence between the 
across-household-type diﬀerence in the marginal response to aggregate shocks and that in the 
marginal response to idiosyncratic shocks. Since the marginal response to exogenous shocks 
is identiﬁed by the double diﬀerence in household consumption between two time periods as 
well as across villages, our approach may be considered to be a sort of quadruple diﬀerenc­
ing.  The employment of this methodology is motivated by the possibility of a coexistence 
of risk sharing among villagers and intertemporal resource allocation using credit markets 
outside the village.  Among existing studies, Asdrubali and Kim (2008) and Morten (2010) 
also proposed methodologies to analyze consumption smoothing with a focus on the diﬀer­
ence between the marginal response to aggregate shocks and that to idiosyncratic shocks. 
However, we attempt to be explicit in specifying partial risk sharing while Asdrubali and 
Kim (2008) did not explicitly consider this aspect. Moreover, our approach directly focuses 
on consumption smoothing while Morten (2010) analyzed remittance transfer. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  data  used  in  this  study  is 
described in Section 2.  The empirical model and empirical strategy employed for inferring 
the theoretical mechanism underlying the heterogeneous response of consumption to village-
level shocks is presented in Section 3.  The econometric results are presented in Section 4 
and the conclusion is presented in Section 5. 
32  Data
 
2.1  Characteristics of Pakistan’s economy 
Pakistan  is  a  federal  state  comprising  the  four  provinces  of  Punjab,  Sindh,  NWFP,  and 
Balochistan. In general, Punjab and Sindh are regarded as economically advanced provinces, 
while NWFP and Balochistan are regarded as backward provinces.  One diﬃculty in com­
paring the four provinces is the diﬀerence in their sizes.  In terms of population as well as 
production, Punjab is the largest and accounts for over half of the national population. Sindh 
is the second largest and accounts for 23% of the national population, followed by NWFP, 
which accounts for 14%. Further, Balochistan is the largest in terms of area (approximately 
45% of Pakistan’s territory) but the smallest in terms of population (only 4% of the national 
population). The isolation and remoteness of Balochistan makes it diﬃcult to obtain reliable 
data for this province. 
Another dimension of spatial disparity in Pakistan is the diﬀerence in living standards 
between urban and rural areas.  Even after adjusting for diﬀerences in prices, income and 
expenditure levels  in  urban  areas  are  much  higher  than  in  rural  areas.  The  urban-rural 
disparity is the greatest in Sindh, where the rural regions are lagging behind in terms of 
income, education, health facilities, and so on, and are characterized by a few big landlords 
and numerous landless sharecroppers (Naqvi et al., 1989; Perera, 2003). 
Although declining,  the share of agriculture in Pakistan’s GDP continues to be high 
at over 20% (Government of Pakistan, various issues).  There are two main crop seasons: 
2 Kharif  and Rabi.  Since most land in Pakistan is semi-arid and arid, crop production in 
both seasons is highly dependent on irrigation. Despite the fact that Pakistan has the largest 
irrigated agricultural area among developing countries, agricultural output ﬂuctuates sub­
stantially (Kurosaki, 1998). This is because the availability of canal water depends on rainfall 
in the Himalaya, which ﬂuctuates every year; moreover, the availability of irrigation water 
at the farm level is disrupted frequently due to administration problems in the irrigation 
system. The majority of agricultural households combine crop farming and livestock raising 
as their main livelihood.  Bullock cattle and she-buﬀaloes for milk are the most important 
large livestock animals, while small livestock animals including sheep and goats are impor­
tant  means  of  saving.  In  addition  to  the  agricultural  sector,  the  non-agricultural  sector 
includes agro-industries (such as cotton-based textiles) and agro-services (such as trade of 
agricultural produce).  Thus, due to the substantial dependence on the agricultural sector, 
the performance of Pakistan’s macroeconomy as a whole ﬂuctuates substantially, depending 
2The Kharif  crop is the monsoon or autumn crop for which harvests come in September-November; rice, 
cotton, and maize are major Kharif  crops.  The Rabi  crop is the spring crop of the dry season for which 
harvests come in March-June; wheat and gram pulse are major Rabi crops. 
4on the weather. 
Recent changes in Pakistanis’ average consumption, inequality among them, and their 
poverty levels can be analyzed using repeated cross-section household datasets. For instance, 
Kurosaki (2009) characterized these changes using four rounds of nationally-representative, 
repeated cross-section data (PIHS/PSLM data) surveyed by the Federal Bureau of Statistics 
of the Government of Pakistan for 1998/99,3  2001/02, 2004/05, and 2005/06.  His results 
revealed that the average consumption declined initially and increased in the two subsequent 
periods; the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures moved in the opposite direc­
tion; inequality decreased from 1998/99 to 2001/02, then it increased rapidly from 2001/02 
to 2004/05. Nevertheless, since these are based on repeated cross-section data of households, 
we cannot have an idea of how many households actually experienced improvement in their 
welfare.  For such analysis, we need panel data of households. 
2.2  PRHS panel data 
In this paper, we employ micro data from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS), 
which  is  a  unique  panel  dataset  from  Pakistan  with  a  relatively  large  sample  size.  The 
survey was conducted jointly by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and the 
World Bank.  The ﬁrst survey (PRHS-I) was conducted in the period from September 2001 
to  January  2002;  information  was  collected  on  agriculture-related  activities  for  the  crop 
seasons of Kharif  2000 and Rabi  2000/01 and that on consumption corresponding to the 
month preceding the survey.  Approximately 2,700 rural households in all four provinces of 
Pakistan were included in the survey. 
The second survey (PRHS-II) was conducted three years later in the period from August 
to October 2004;  information was collected on the crop seasons of Kharif  2003 and Rabi 
2003/04, and on consumption in the month preceding the survey.  It must be noted that 
because of security problems and other reasons, sample households in NWFP and Balochistan 
were not re-surveyed.4 
From the PRHS panel data, nominal consumption expenditure5 per capita6 in Pakistan 
rupees  was  calculated  and  then  converted  into  real  terms  by  dividing  this  value  by  the 
3Pakistan’s ﬁscal year as well as agricultural year begins on July 1 and ending on June 30 of the next year. 
4In PRHS-I, approximately 450 sample households were surveyed in NWFP and approximately 400 sample 
households were surveyed in Balochistan. 
5Since numerous farm households in Pakistan are subsistence-oriented and numerous rural laborer house­
holds are occasionally paid in kind, the value of these non-cash transactions were carefully imputed using 
village-level prices for calculating the consumption expenditure. 
6To  be  precise,  “per  capita”  implies  “per  adult  equivalence  unit,”  which  is  the  unit  adopted  by  the 
Government of Pakistan to establish the oﬃcial poverty line.  Individuals who are 18 years old or above are 
assigned the weight of 1.0 and others are assigned 0.8. 
5oﬃcial poverty line.7  This is known as the “welfare ratio” and is denoted as cit below, where 
subscript i refers to individual i and t refers to the survey year. Individuals with cit ≥ 1 are 
classiﬁed as non-poor and those with cit < 1 are classiﬁed as poor. 
In this paper, a balanced panel of 1,609 households (929 in Punjab and 680 in Sindh) 
is employed, for which complete consumption information was available in both surveys. In 
PRHS-I, the number of sample households in Punjab and Sindh with complete consumption 
information was 1,874, thereby implying an attrition rate of 14%. 
In PRHS-I, the sample households were randomly drawn from sample villages and the 
sample villages were selected as broadly representative of each province.  Therefore, if the 
attrition was purely random, the PRHS panel data are broadly representative of rural Punjab 
and Sindh.  Comparing the panel households with those that were excluded from PRHS-II, 
we found that the average  cit  in PRHS-I among the excluded households was 12% lower 
than that among the households in the panel sample, and the diﬀerence was statistically 
signiﬁcant  (p  value  =  0.029).  On  the  other  hand,  household  size  and  composition  were 
similar between the two groups (the diﬀerence was statistically insigniﬁcant).  This suggests 
a possibility of weak attrition bias in that initially poor households were more likely to be 
excluded from the sample.  Furthermore, those households that were aﬀected so severely by 
exogenous shocks that they physically disappeared or became unable to be re-surveyed have 
not been included in the panel data. This implies that the portion of vulnerable households 
that is worst hit by natural calamities are not included in our dataset. 
Table 1 presents three welfare measures based on the PRHS panel data:  average of cit, 
poverty measures, and Atkinson’s (1970) inequality measures. Since there is a socioeconomic 
gap between the northern and southern parts of Punjab, we divide Punjab into two portions.8 
The changes between PRHS-I (2001) and PRHS-II (2004) are similar to the changes between 
PIHS 2001/02 and PSLM 2004/05, which are nationally representative.  The poverty level 
gauged by three FGT measures decreased substantially from 2001 to 2004.  The decrease 
was slightly larger in Sindh than in northern and southern Punjab,  thereby reducing the 
7The oﬃcial poverty line of Pakistan is close to the level of 1 PPP$/day (1.25 PPP$/day in 2005 price), 
which is adopted widely in the international comparisons.  The oﬃcial poverty line was converted into the 
poverty line for each PRHS round in four steps: First, the poverty headcount rate for rural Punjab and Sindh 
was estimated at 38.5% using PIHS 2001/02 data and the oﬃcial poverty line.  Second, the poverty line for 
PRHS-I was ﬁxed in order to generate the same poverty headcount rate using PRHS-I data for rural Punjab 
and Sindh,  including  the households that were  excluded  from PRHS-II. Third,  an  intertemporal inﬂation 
rate of 15.2% between PRHS-I and PRHS-II was estimated by weighting monthly CPIs by the number of 
observations  for  each  corresponding  month  for  PRHS-I  and  PRHS-II  data.  Fourth,  the  poverty  line  for 
PRHS-II was ﬁxed by multiplying the PRHS-I poverty line by the inﬂation rate. 
8There is no oﬃcial division of Punjab into North Punjab and South Punjab.  From among 35 districts in 
Punjab, 6 districts were surveyed in PRHS, and from among these six, 3 districts of Attock, Faisalabad, and 
Haﬁzabad are classiﬁed as “northern Punjab” and 3 districts of Bahawalpur, Muzaﬀargarh, and Vehari are 
classiﬁed as “southern Punjab” in this paper.  Moreover, from among 22 districts in Sindh, the PRHS data 
include 4 districts of Badin, Larkana, Mirpur Khas, and Nawabshah. 
6gap between the two provinces. In both Punjab and Sindh, inequality increased during this 
period. This is similar to the change observed in nationally representative household surveys 
between 2001/02 and 2004/05. Thus, it is evident from Table 1 that there is a clear ranking 
of average economic well-being among the three regions: northern Punjab at the top, Sindh 
at the bottom, and southern Punjab in between. 
2.3  Poverty transition at the household level 
In  order  to  utilize  the  advantage  of  panel  data,  Table  2  classiﬁes  sample  households  by 
their status of poverty transition.  From among 1,609 sample households, 182 were below 
the poverty line in both periods (“chronically poor”), 342 were below the poverty line in 
PRHS-I but above it in PRHS-II (“getting out of poverty”), 176 were above the poverty line 
in PRHS-I but below it in PRHS-II (“falling into poverty”), and 909 were on or above the 
poverty line in both periods (“never poor”). In terms of individual population, 13.4% of the 
PRHS-I individuals belonged to the “chronically poor” households, 23.7% to the “getting 
out of poverty” households, 11.6% to the “falling into poverty” households, and 51.2% to 
the “never poor” households. 
In terms of transition probability, 65.3% of households who were poor in PRHS-I became 
non-poor in PRHS-II, while 16.2% of households who were non-poor in PRHS-I became poor 
three years later in PRHS-II. Therefore, we observe a high level of poverty mobility during 
the survey periods. The vulnerability measured by the incidence of falls into poverty is thus 
rather high in rural Pakistan. Further, the transition probability from non-poor to poor was 
higher in Sindh (23.5%) than in southern Punjab (16.3%) and northern Punjab (9.9%).  It 
must be noted that these falls into poverty occurred when the average poverty headcount 
ratio decreased.  Thus, the aggregate ﬁgure conceals, from a micro viewpoint, the fact that 
certain households suﬀered from a severe decline in their overall welfare during the survey 
period. 
A comparison of the three regions reveals that dwellers in rural Sindh were more vul­
nerable than those in rural Punjab.  This regional contrast in vulnerability is robust to the 
application of other methodologies to the same panel data (see, e.g., Arif and Bilquees, 2008; 
Kurosaki, 2009). 
Idiosyncratic and village-level negative shocks may possibly be responsible for the con­
sumption decline of certain households when the nation experienced a consumption increase 
on average.  As an indicator of idiosyncratic shocks, we constructed a dummy variable from 
the PRHS panel data for households whose members experienced a severe health shock due 
to injury or sickness that resulted in treatment in medical institutions during the two survey 
periods. Approximately 7% of the sample households experienced such shocks. 
7Further, with regard to village-level shocks, 24 variables were available in PRHS-II, all 
of which assessed the negative impact due to natural disasters on a ﬁve-point scale: 0 (“No 
eﬀect”: no report for crop damage), 1 (“Little eﬀect”: yield loss up to 10%), 2 (“Moderate”: 
10-25% loss), 3 (“Severe”:  25-50% loss), and 4 (“Disaster”:  over 50% loss).  Three types of 
disasters were investigated:  drought, ﬂood, and pest attack.  Eight cropping seasons up to 
the survey reference period (i.e., from Kharif  2000 to Rabi  2003/04) were covered.  Since 
we found that drought damage variables in a year are highly correlated with pest attack 
variables in the same year,9 we exclude pest attack variables in the analysis below and focus 
only on droughts and ﬂoods. 
Table 3 presents the incidence of these disasters from 2000 to 2004.  It is evident that 
droughts are more common than ﬂoods — they occurred in all three regions with similar 
frequency.  On the other hand, ﬂood damage was not reported from northern Punjab, and 
only infrequently from southern Punjab. In other words, ﬂoods occurred most frequently in 
Sindh in the period. It may appear that the variation in drought and ﬂood damage reported 
at the village level are in eﬀect more aggregate, with little eﬀective variation across villages 
within a region. In order to investigate whether or not this applies to our data, we examined 
the spatial correlations of drought and ﬂood variables.  For example, only 17.3% (21.3%) of 
the variation of the drought (ﬂood) damage variable was explained by variation across the 
three regions.  The rest were within-region and between-village variations.10  Such variation 
will be utilized in identifying the eﬀects of village-level shocks on overall household welfare. 
3  Analytical Framework 
3.1  Empirical model 
One shortcoming of the transient poverty analysis in Table 2 is that it does not take into 
account changes  in household consumption  that may have  occurred  without crossing the 
poverty line.  The consumption levels of some of the “chronically poor” may have been sta­
ble and slightly below the poverty line, while those of others of the “chronically poor” may 
have been ﬂuctuating annually. In such a case, it may be preferable to regard the latter type 
as more vulnerable than the former type.  Another issue is that it is possible that some of 
the observed changes in consumption levels were anticipated by the household. If this is the 
case, the observed changes in consumption must be decomposed into anticipated and unan­
ticipated components.  Thus, we regress consumption changes on the initial characteristics 
9The correlation coeﬃcients between drought damage and pest attacks were in the range from 0.363 to 
0.741, all of which were statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while those between drought and ﬂood damage 
were in the range from -0.199 to -0.015, all of which were not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. 
10The number of sample villages in each region is 23 in northern Punjab, 25 in southern Punjab, and 46 in 
Sindh. 
8and variables that capture idiosyncratic and village-level shocks that were unexpected by 
the household. Since there are only two periods in our panel dataset, the empirical model is 
given by a cross-sectional regression model for household i: 
Δln  ci = X1ib0 + ZvX2ib1 + ZiX2ib2 + 向i,  (1) 
where Δ ln ci  =l n  cit − ln ci,t−1; X1i  is a vector of household characteristics in period t − 1 
such as physical assets owned by the household,  income sources,  credit access,  education 
level of the household head,  and demographic composition;  Zv  is a vector of village-level 
production shock variables (ﬂoods and droughts) for household i living in village v; X2i is a 
subset of X1i used as a shifter for the household’s ability to cope with village-level shocks; Zi 
is the idiosyncratic health shock; b0, b1, and b2 are vectors of the parameters to be estimated; 
and 向i is a zero mean error term. X1i includes the intercept term and region dummies. 
When the economy was hit by nation-wide negative shocks, parameter b0  may be in­
terpreted as a measure of vulnerability since it indicates the household attributes in X1i 
that are associated with a larger decline in consumption in the face of nation-wide shocks 
(Ravallion, 1995; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; Glewwe and Hall, 1998).  However, since there 
was an overall growth in the economy in our dataset, it is preferable to interpret parameter 
b0  as an indicator of which households were not able to keep up with the national growth 
trend. 
Further,  when only the intercept term is included in X2i,  parameter b1  indicates the 
double-diﬀerence estimator11  for the impact of drought (ﬂood) on consumption; vector b1 
is expected to be negative.  When region dummies are included in X2i,  the diﬀerence in 
vulnerability across regions can be examined. Moreover, when households’ initial attributes 
are included in X2i,  vector b1  indicates which household attributes are associated with a 
larger decline in consumption if the village is hit by a production shock Zv. Thus, parameter 
b1 is of main interest of this paper. 
The model presented in equation (1) is an extension of the excess sensitivity of household-
level consumption to idiosyncratic shocks after controlling for village-level aggregate shocks 
(Townsend, 1994; Kurosaki, 2006a).  The extent to which household consumption responds 
to idiosyncratic shocks (parameter b2) may be interpreted as one measure of vulnerability 
(Amin et al., 2003; Skouﬁas and Quisumbing, 2005). However, since our main motivation is 
to identify the impacts of village-level aggregate shocks, parameter b2  itself is not of main 
interest in this paper. Further, since Zi is orthogonal to Zv by deﬁnition, the entire expression 
ZiX2ib2 can be excluded and merged into 向i without aﬀecting our ability to obtain unbiased 
11The ﬁrst diﬀerence is across time (the dependent variable is the change in consumption) and the second 
diﬀerence is with respect to villages distinguished by drought and ﬂood shocks. 
912 estimates for b0  and b1.  Nevertheless, we include the term ZiX2ib2  because it enables us 
to infer the theoretical mechanisms underlying the heterogeneity of household responses to 
village-level shocks. The main idea is to examine the diﬀerence between the across-household­
type diﬀerence in marginal response to aggregate shocks (b1 with respect to some household 
attribute) and the diﬀerence in marginal response to idiosyncratic shocks (b2  with respect 
to  the  same  household  attribute).  This  approach  may  be  termed  a  sort  of  “quadruple” 
diﬀerencing,13 which is explained in greater detail below using a simple household model. 
3.2	  Inference of the theoretical mechanisms underlying the heterogeneous 
response to village-level shocks 
Let Wit be the forward-looking welfare of household i in period t based on a standard model 
deﬁned as	    ∞    τ   
言  1 
Wit = Ui(cit)+  Et Ui(ci,t+τ ) ,	  (2)
1+  δ τ=1
where U(.) is an instantaneous utility function that satisﬁes U"(.) > 0,U""(.) < 0, δ is the 
subjective discount rate, and E[.] is an expectation operator. We assume the following simple 
budget constraint that comprises 
yit +( 1+  rit)si,t−1 + xit − cit − sit =0 ,	  (3) 
P T  T = y  + y	  (4) yit	 i  t (Zvt)+  yit (Zit), 
xit = git(θt,H t),	  (5) 
P where yit (exogenous income ﬂow to household i) is the sum of non-stochastic income (y ), i 
T village-level aggregate transient income (y ) a function of the village-level shock Zvt, and  t 
T idiosyncratic transient income (yit ) a function of the idiosyncratic shock Zit;  si,t−1  is net 
saving (credit if negative) from t − 1t o  t; rit  is the market interest rate on si,t−1; xit  is a 
net transfer receipt (payment if negative) of household i in period t from other members 
in the risk-sharing network; and g(..) is a function for determining the net transfer receipt, 
which has as arguments vector θt (rules and institutions that determine the risk-sharing rule) 
and vector Ht, which includes the history of exogenous shocks in income until period t and 
the endogenous decisions of consumptions, savings, and transfers until period t − 1 by all 
members in the risk-sharing network.14 
12Our regression results indicate that this is true, as shown below. 
13The third diﬀerence is with respect to household types and the fourth diﬀerence is between village-level 
aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. 
14See Ligon et al.  (2000, 2002) for an example of function g(..) under partial risk sharing due to limited 
commitment problems.  In their cases, the function has a diﬀerent form in both dimensions of i and t, and 
Ht  includes all the history.  In the classic full risk-sharing case analyzed by Townsend (1994), the functional 
form diﬀers only in the i dimension, and Ht  includes only the t period exogenous shocks. 
10In period t, household i chooses cit, xit, and sit  in order to maximize Wit  subject to 
budget constraints.  The optimal solution (the policy function) for the household regarding 
consumption may be expressed in the following reduced-form: 
∗  P T T  cit = fit(yi  ,y t ,y it ,r it,θ t,H t).  (6) 
Using the reduced-form expression,  we investigate  the marginal  response of optimal  con­
sumption to  transient income,  β1  ≡  ∂c∗  and β2  it/∂yT ,  from  which  we derive  it/∂yT  ≡  ∂c∗ 
t  it 
empirical predictions regarding b1  and b2  in equation (1).  Due to risk aversion, households 
would choose a completely smoothed consumption path even if their income is ﬂuctuating, 
if such a path is feasible. However, intertemporal transactions are likely to suﬀer from credit 
(or liquidity) constraints, which are likely to be binding when the households’ cash in hand 
is low, thereby resulting in non-smooth consumption (Deaton, 1991; 1992).  Similarly, risk 
sharing among villagers in a village may suﬀer from information asymmetry (Ligon, 1998) 
and limited commitment (Ligon et al., 2000; 2002), thereby resulting in only partial insur­
ance to idiosyncratic shocks to income because villagers cannot completely pool their income 
under such conditions. 
(i) Hand-to-mouth economy 
In an extreme case, when households have no means to smooth consumption (i.e., households 
do not belong to a risk-sharing network and cannot access any intertemporal resource allo­
∗ cation technology), their optimal consumption c  simply equals yit  due to the assumption  it 
of U "(.) > 0. Therefore, 
β1 = β2 = 1  (7) 
should hold for all households. Applying this to our empirical model (equation (1)), assuming 
that  the  income  shock  aﬀects  the  transient  income  linearly  at  the  same  rate  among  all 
households, we obtain the empirical relation bA  = bB  < 0 and bA  = bB  < 0; the absolute  1 1  2 2 
values obtained for the four parameters are all very large. This implies that due to the absence 
of consumption-smoothing opportunities, household consumption declines signiﬁcantly when 
a household is hit by idiosyncratic or village-level shocks. 
(ii) Full risk sharing with no intertemporal technology 
1 1−Ri We assume the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preference, i.e., Ui(ci)=  c  , 1−Ri  i 
where Ri  is an Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (heterogeneous risk prefer­
ence).15  Under this assumption, the optimal solution under full risk sharing can be charac­
15Since Kurosaki (2001) found no evidence for heterogeneous time preference among South Asian house­
holds, this paper assumes a homogenous time preference. 
11terized by 
1 1 1 1 ¯ " " ln ln ln ln ln (8) + + + −  μ λ α β = = t c c it i  , t t i 1+ R R R δ i i i 
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint in the risk-sharing  μt 
group in period  is a Pareto-Negishi weight for household  ln is the group mean of  λ i t c , , i t 
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⎡ ⎤ 
1 1  言 
βi 
"  ≡ 
Ri 
⎣ln λi − 
N
αj ln λj ⎦ ,  (10) 
j 
where N  is the number of households in the risk-sharing group.  Equation (8) intuitively 
indicates that optimal consumption comprises a variable portion that is proportional to the 
group mean consumption at the rate of α  "  and a ﬁxed portion β  "  Equation (9) implies that  i i. 
 
when household i is more risk-averse than the group average in the sense that < , Ri  N j Rj 
α  " becomes smaller than unity; in other words, the household’s share in variable consumption  i 
is smaller than the group average. Equation (10) implies that the risk-sharing group allocates 
consumption to households according to the size of λi. Although the weights can assume any 
positive values under the social planner’s optimization framework, there exists a mapping 
from  the  consumption  allocation  under  a  full-information  competitive  equilibrium  to  the 
consumption allocation under the social planner’s problem with a speciﬁc vector of λ. Under 
such competitive equilibrium, wealthier households who can contribute more to the group 
income pool on average are assigned higher λi and hence have higher consumption. 
Therefore, if all households in the risk-sharing network have a homogeneous risk prefer­
ence, 










should hold for all households.  The empirical implication of this is that bA 
bA = bB =0 . 
On the other hand, if the households have a heterogeneous risk preference, 
βA > 1 >β B , βA = βB = 0  (12) 
should hold, where household A is relatively risk-loving and B is relatively risk-averse.  In 
our empirical model, bA <b B < 0 and bA = bB = 0 should hold. 
(iii) Access to an external credit market with no risk sharing 
Under the permanent income hypothesis with inﬁnite time horizon and a quadratic utility 
T function, the optimal marginal response of consumption to completely transient income (yt 
1 = bB  < 0 and  1 
12T and y ) is equal to r/(1 + r) (Deaton, 1992). With no risk sharing, the distinction between  it 
village-level and idiosyncratic shocks is not signiﬁcant for the household.  Therefore, if all 
households have homogeneous access to the external credit market, 
1 >β 1 = β2 = r/(1 + r) > 0  (13) 
should hold for all households.
  1 1 Thus, the empirical implication is that bA  bB 






parameters are all small due to intertemporal smoothing.  Therefore, in empirical exercise,
 
this case could be easily distinguished from case (i).
 
On the other hand, if households have heterogeneous access to the credit market and 
are faced with diﬀerent interest rates, eﬀectively, 
2 2 
2 1 1 >β A = βA B)=  βB = βB 
should hold, where the interest rate for household A is higher than that for household B. In 
2 1 
A/(1 + r  A) >r B/(1 + r  > 0  (14)
 = r
 
2 2 1 1 terms of the empirical model of this paper, bA <b B < 0 and bA <b B 
Although the above relations are derived under the restrictive assumption of a quadratic 
2
utility function and perfect access to an external credit market, their key characteristics — 
2 
those with better access to credit are better able to mitigate the ill-eﬀects of shocks and this 
ability should not diﬀer between the ability to deal with village-level aggregate shocks and 
against idiosyncratic shocks — are likely to hold under less restrictive assumptions as well.16 
1
(iv) Combining credit market with risk sharing 
1 
It is not an  easy task to model situations where risk sharing and intertemporal resource 
allocation coexists for a household.  The simplest case is when households form a full risk-
sharing network and have access to the external credit market. In this case, insurable shocks 
T of y are completely smoothed through village-level risk sharing while uninsurable shocks of  it
 
T
 y are partially smoothed through intertemporal resource allocation at the lowest interest  t 
rate among the villagers (r  ∗). Thus, the optimal solution should satisfy 
1 >β 1 = r  ∗ /(1 + r  ∗) >β 2 = 0  (15) 
for all households. This is the Pareto optimal allocation with the highest level of consumption 
smoothing among all the cases considered in this subsection. Qualitatively, its implication is 
that bA = bB < 0 and bA = bB 
< 0.
 
= 0, which is the same for the case of full risk sharing among
 
< 0
 1 1 homogeneous households with no access to credit markets; however, the slope of bA = bB 
is less steeper than the case of risk sharing, thereby distinguishing this case from other cases. 
16Numerical results showing this are available on request, using the CRRA utility case. 
13As analyzed by  Ligon et al.  (2002),  access to  the external  credit market  may cause 
the full risk sharing more diﬃcult to sustain under limited commitment.  This is because a 
household that happens to have a high transient income has an incentive to renege the risk-
sharing contract and save the transient income, thereby leaving the risk-sharing network for 
self-insurance.  The case described above is sustainable only in a community with a highly 
strong  ability  to  avoid  such  reneges.  Without  such  an  ability,  the  limited  commitment 
is likely to result in partial risk sharing.  Under partial risk-sharing regimes with limited 
commitment, access to the external credit market may worsen the condition of households 
due to more partial risk sharing (Ligon et al., 2000), while transfers under such partial risk 
sharing appear as debt contracts (Ligon et al., 2002). In these cases, the relationship among 
βA , βB , βA, and βB 
2 2 1 1 depends on how we model g(..) and the household’s credit access.
 
3.3  Short summary of the empirical strategy 
Let us summarize our empirical strategy.  First, a simpliﬁed version of our empirical model 
with  no  cross  term  identiﬁes  the  causal  eﬀect  of  natural  disasters  and  health  shocks  on 
consumption through double diﬀerencing.  Then by considering the third diﬀerencing with 
respect to household types and compare the third diﬀerence between village-level shocks and 
idiosyncratic shocks (the fourth diﬀerence), we can infer the economic mechanisms underlying 
incomplete consumption smoothing. 
However, the theoretical inference in this paper is incomplete in two senses.  First, the 
2 2 1 1 restrictions on bA , bB , bA, and bB 
the restrictions are only a partial characterization of possible patterns of coeﬃcients. Thus, 
it is necessary that the theoretical inference be made more complete.  The limitation that 




restrictions are only necessary conditions implies that the same relationship among bA , bB 
bA, and bB could occur under a diﬀerent mechanism as well. For example, if exogenous income 
,
 
shocks (aggregate or idiosyncratic) aﬀect the household transient income disproportionally,
 
depending on the household type, we may have estimation results that indicate a diﬀerence
 
2 2 1 1 between  bA  and  bB,  and  between  bA  and  bB 
interpreting the regression results in the next section. 
4  Sensitivity of Consumption Changes to Village-level Shocks 
4.1  Empirical variables 
Since the main  objective  of this  paper is  to analyze  the vulnerability  of households in  a 
low-income  country  like  Pakistan  to  a  decline  in  consumption  due  to  a  natural  disaster, 
we exclude relatively rich households (ci,t−1  > 4o r  cit  > 4) in the regression analysis.  In 
addition, we also exclude households that experienced a drastic change in their demographic 
.  This  possibility  will  also  be  considered  in
 
14structure (households in which the change in the number of household members was equal 
to or over 4). This reduced the sample size from 1,609 (Tables 1 and 2) to 1,293. Thereafter, 
the consumption was re-calculated after excluding the medical expenditure since it is highly 
correlated with Zi (idiosyncratic health shock) and the increase in consumption due to Zi =1 
does not imply an increase in welfare. In other words, the total consumption in the regression 
analysis is the consumption excluding durables, house rent, and medical expenditures. 
As controls for household characteristics, vector X1i includes variables such as physical 
assets owned by the household (farmland, livestock, sum of the value of durable consumption 
goods,  transportation equipment,  house buildings,  etc.),  income sources (number of male 
working members engaged in non-farm work, existence of remittance receipts, etc.), credit 
access,  education  level  of  the  household  head,  and  demographic  composition  (number  of 
household members, female ratio among them, and dependency ratio).17 
After attempting several methods of aggregating the sixteen variables presented in Table 
3, we report the results with two aggregated variables for drought and ﬂood in two agricul­
tural years of 2002/03 and 2003/04, normalized between zero and one.  The robustness of 
our results with respect to this deﬁnition will be investigated below. Since the consumption 
data in PRHS-II were collected in August-October 2004, the agricultural output in 2002/03 
and 2003/04 should have had the most direct eﬀect on household consumption.  Produc­
tion shocks that occurred before these two years may have aﬀected the consumption level 
reported in PRHS-I. For this reason, we use the shocks in the last two years as village-level 
shocks that are exogenous to initial consumption and unanticipated by villagers. 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for empirical variables that have been compiled 
for this analysis. They are weighted by the household size in order to obtain individual-level 
means and standard deviations, since the regression analysis is conducted in order to gauge 
individual welfare. 
4.2  Estimation results 
4.2.1  Sensitivity of consumption to shocks 
Table 5 presents the estimation results of equation (1),  both excluding (speciﬁcation (i)) 
and including cross-terms (speciﬁcations (ii)-(iv)).  Examining speciﬁcation (i), it is evident 
that among household characteristics X1i, ﬁve variables have statistically signiﬁcant coef­
ﬁcients:  the size of owned land (negative),  number of small livestock animals (negative), 
17With regard to education and landholding, the use of dummy variables distinguishing zero and positive 
years of education or positive acreage of owned land was attempted as well; this yielded results that were 
similar to those reported in this paper.  With regard to the access to non-farm jobs, variables characterizing 
female workers engaged in non-farm jobs were not included because the average was close to zero and the 
variation was small. 
15number of male household members who were employed permanently in regular non-farm 
jobs (positive), remittance receipt dummy (positive), and dependency ratio (positive).  The 
ﬁnding that households with larger landholding or larger livestock were lagging behind in 
consumption growth appears to suggest that growth from 2001 to 2004 was based on non-
agricultural sectors. It may be tempting to interpret this ﬁnding to indicate that households 
in which more members were employed in non-farm permanent employment jobs were less 
vulnerable to a stochastic decline in consumption.  However,  the positive coeﬃcient may 
simply reﬂect the life-cycle improvement in earnings associated with non-farm permanent 
jobs (e.g., regular promotion).  The positive impact of remittance receipt on consumption 
growth is also consistent with prior expectation. The ﬁnding that households with a greater 
number of dependent household members experienced higher growth in consumption may 
simply reﬂect the fact that children (the majority among the dependent members) require 
larger amount of consumption after they become older by three years.18  All other variables 
are insigniﬁcant. The proxy variables for credit constraints have a positive sign, as expected 
from the theoretical model (Deaton, 1991);  however,  the coeﬃcients were statistically in­
signiﬁcant. The impact of household characteristics remains qualitatively the same when we 
introduce the cross-terms of natural disasters and region dummies (see speciﬁcation (ii) in 
Table 5). These patterns of parameter estimates for b0 on X1i are robustly found under dif­
ferent speciﬁcations. Therefore, parameter estimates for b0 are not reported in the following 
tables in order to save space. 
With regard to coeﬃcients on village-level production shocks, the coeﬃcients on natural 
disasters  are  all  negative  in  speciﬁcation  (i).  However,  only  the  coeﬃcient  on  ﬂoods  is 
statistically  signiﬁcant:  it  indicates  that  households  had  to  reduce  consumption  by  37% 
(1 − exp(−0.4654) = 0.3721) when their village was hit by a ﬂood that destroyed over 50% 
of Kharif  and Rabi crops. This implies a substantial decline in welfare. On the other hand, 
the coeﬃcients on drought damages and health shocks have smaller absolute values and are 
statistically insigniﬁcant.  This indicates the existence of some sort of insurance mechanism 
against droughts and health shocks in the study area on average. 
The contrast between droughts/health shocks and ﬂoods could be understood by the 
insurability of shocks within a region. Theoretically, it is easy to insure health shocks within 
a village since they are idiosyncratic. Drought shocks are more aggregate than health shocks; 
however, because droughts are highly common in rural Pakistan, villagers may have estab­
lished an institution to insure against them across villages within a region.  On the other 
hand, it is diﬃcult to insure against ﬂoods because they disrupt across-village transportation 
18When we subdivide the sample into the relatively rich and relatively poor by the median of the welfare 
ratio, depratio has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient only among the former. It is negative and statistically 
insigniﬁcant among the poor.  This appears to support the life cycle interpretation. 
16and communication.  With disrupted transportation and communication, the institutional 
arrangement becomes less eﬀective.  This is only a speculation and the examination of esti­
mation results using cross-terms will enable us to examine the validity of this speculation. 
In order to examine whether there are any regional diﬀerences in terms of the extent of 
consumption smoothing ability against natural disasters, speciﬁcation (ii) in Table 5 permits 
the coeﬃcient on Zv to diﬀer across the three regions. Since no incidence of ﬂood was reported 
from northern Punjab, the cross-terms that include ﬂoods are only for southern Punjab and 
Sindh.  With  regard  to  the  eﬀect  of  droughts  and  health  shocks,  all  coeﬃcients  remain 
statistically insigniﬁcant.  Further, with regard to the eﬀect of ﬂoods, only the coeﬃcient 
for Sindh is signiﬁcant.  However, the coeﬃcient for southern Punjab has a large absolute 
value, thereby suggesting that there is the potential of a negative impact; however, it is not 
statistically discernible due to the infrequency of ﬂoods in this region.  In addition, the null 
hypothesis that the impact of shocks is the same in all regions is not rejected at the 10% 
level.  Therefore, no spatial heterogeneity is found in marginal impacts of natural disasters 
and  idiosyncratic  shocks.  For  this  reason,  the  cross-terms  with  region  dummies  are  not 
included in the following speciﬁcations. 
In order to further examine the heterogeneity in the marginal impact of a natural dis­
aster, household-level characteristics were interacted with village-level shocks (speciﬁcation 
(iii) in Table 5). From among the ﬁfteen household-level variables, seven are chosen as poten­
tial shifters of the marginal impact. Four of them (size of land holdings, number of household 
members employed in permanent non-agricultural jobs, dummy for remittance receipts, and 
dependency ratio) are those variables in X1i  in equation (1) that have robustly signiﬁcant 
coeﬃcients.  The other three (dummy for credit constraint in the formal sector, age of the 
household head, and education level of the household head) are those variables that were 
found to be associated with several measures of vulnerability analyzed by Kurosaki (2009). 
In speciﬁcation (iii), the regression results including all these cross-terms are reported, while 
in speciﬁcation (iv), the model was made parsimonious by deleting statistically insigniﬁcant 
interaction terms.19 
The following results are revealed from the analysis. More landed households and those 
with  more  dependent members  were more  capable  of  isolating  their consumption  from  a 
drought-driven  income  decline.  In  addition,  the  ill-eﬀects  of  ﬂooding  are  mitigated  if  a 
household is more landed, younger, and more educated.  Further, with regard to the impact 
of idiosyncratic health shocks on consumption, greater land holding and access to formal 
credit  help  to  mitigate  the  ill  impact  of  such  shocks  on  consumption.  Moreover,  access 
19More concretely, we ﬁrst retained those cross-terms with the 15% level of signiﬁcance and re-estimated 
the model.  We then retained those cross-terms with the 10% level in the second analysis and re-estimated 
the model again.  The results of the third regression are reported as the ﬁnal parsimonious speciﬁcation. 
17to formal credit also mitigates the shock due to droughts and ﬂoods, although this is not 
statistically signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcations reported in Table 5. 
Now we make inferences on the theoretical mechanisms through the quadruple diﬀerenc­
ing approach that is explained in Section 3. First, those with relatively less landholdings and 
limited access to credit are vulnerable to a larger decline in consumption when hit by ﬂoods 
and droughts on the one hand, and by health shocks on the other. This is a pattern consistent 
with the regime of unequal access to credit markets. It may be interpreted that the amount 
of landholding has the eﬀect of reducing household vulnerability by improving their ability 
in intertemporal resource allocation. Since the land sales market is thin in rural Pakistan, it 
is likely that this ability is due to the collateral and social value of land (Hirashima, 2008). 
The observed pattern among the coeﬃcient estimates involving land is diﬃcult to explain by 
the argument based on the heterogenous impact of exogenous shocks on household transient 
income, since the total income of more landed households must be aﬀected proportionally 
more by ﬂoods and droughts as compared with less landed households. Moreover, the access 
to formal credit, by deﬁnition, improves the ability of households in intertemporal resource 
allocation; thus, its cross-terms may be interpreted similarly as those for land. 
In contrast, households headed by educated and elder household heads and households 
with a greater number of working members are subject to a larger consumption decline when 
hit by ﬂoods or droughts. From the viewpoint of household ability in intertemporal resource 
allocation, this appears to be a puzzle. However, this may be clariﬁed from the viewpoint of 
the theory of full risk sharing.  Such households are less risk-averse than other households; 
thus, it is more eﬃcient for them to bear greater aggregate risk (in return for higher expected 
values of transfers from the risk-sharing network).  With regard to the eﬀect of education, 
it is found that there is a greater consumption decline due to ﬂoods among more educated 
households, which suggests that educated households are able to behave in a less risk-averse 
manner in the optimal village-level risk sharing due to the fact that they possess greater 
human capital.  As another support for this interpretation, none of the three shifters (age 
of household head, education level of household head, and dependency ratio) is statistically 
signiﬁcant in ZiX2i.  The overall pattern is in favor of the regime under full risk sharing 
among heterogeneously risk-averse households.  At the same time,  however,  the observed 
pattern among  the  coeﬃcient  estimates  could  be consistent  with  the  argument  based  on 
heterogenous impact of exogenous shocks on household transient income, if the household 
income  of  those  with  more  educated  and  older  household  heads,  and  greater  number  of 
working members are less aﬀected by droughts and ﬂoods. 
Furthermore,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  impact  of  village-level  shocks  is  the  same 
across diﬀerent household characteristics is rejected at the 1% level. Therefore, the marginal 
18impacts of natural disasters are heterogenous, which is consistent with the co-existence of 
the unequal credit market access and full risk-sharing models among heterogenous villagers. 
4.2.2  Robustness of the empirical results 
The results in Table 5 were found to be robust to various alterations.20  Most importantly, 
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of natural disaster variables were attempted and yielded similar results 
(Table 6).  In the ﬁrst group of columns in Table 6, regression results based on the default 
deﬁnition  are  subtracted  from  those  given  in  Table  5.  In  the  second  group  of  columns 
(alternative (1)), the results based on disaster variables corresponding to the larger disaster 
of the last two years instead of their averages are reported, since it is possible that only 
major disasters matter.  In the last group of columns in Table 6 (alternative (2)), results 
are based on a speciﬁcation using only the most recent disasters (indices corresponding to 
the last agricultural year instead of the averages of the last two years) since the impact of 
disasters may be short-lived. 
Without cross-terms, the estimated patterns are similar to those given in Table 5 — 
only the ﬂood variable has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on consumption growth.  Thus, 
our ﬁnding that ﬂoods are diﬃcult to cope with and have a greater impact on consumption, 
while droughts and health shocks can be insured within a region is conﬁrmed. The negative 
impact of ﬂoods is estimated with a slightly smaller value under diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the 
disaster variables. Villagers had to reduce consumption by 32% (alternative (1)) or by 17% 
(alternative (2)) when their village was hit by a ﬂood that destroy 50% or more of crops. 
Cross-terms of household attributes and droughts/ﬂoods reveal a pattern that is similar to 
that  given  in  Table  5.  Under  alternative  (2),  in  addition to  health  shocks,  the damage-
increasing impact of credit constraint is statistically signiﬁcant with respect to droughts. 
In order to examine whether our assumption of the orthogonality of health shocks to 
village-level natural disasters holds, we re-estimate the same regressions after deleting the 
ZiX2ib2  term.  The results of this re-estimation are similar to those already reported (Ap­
pendix Table 1).  This is as expected since the health shock variables and ﬂood/drought 
variables are not correlated (the bivariate correlation coeﬃcient was not statistically signiﬁ­
cant even at the 20% level).  Thus, our assumption appears to be valid. 
In  a  diﬀerent  direction  for  the  robustness  check,  diﬀerent  weights  were  employed  in 
running the household-level regression. In the default speciﬁcations, we used the number of 
household members in the initial period as the weight to convert the regression results to 
become consistent with individual-based aggregates. Since there was a change in household 
size  of  certain  households  between  the  two  surveys,  weights  based  on  the  second  survey 
20Detailed results of these robustness checks are available on request. 
19and  those  based  on  the  average  of  the  two  were  attempted.  The  results  obtained  with 
this speciﬁcation were almost identical to those reported here (not reported for the sake of 
brevity). 
4.2.3  Vulnerability of food consumption 
In order to infer the underlying mechanisms of the vulnerability of households from a diﬀerent 
angle, we re-estimated the regression models by replacing the total consumption (excluding 
medical expenditure) by only food consumption.  The regression results are summarized in 
Table 7, for which detailed results under the default deﬁnition of drought and ﬂood variables 
are given in Appendix Table 2. As indicated in the lower portion of Table 7, the diﬀerence in 
the marginal impact of shocks across household types is highly similar to the one found for 
total consumption. In other words, the quadruple diﬀerence pattern remains the same even 
when only food consumption is considered.  In this sense, the coexistence of consumption 
smoothing through credit markets and risk sharing is suggested from the dynamics of food 
consumption as well. 
However, an interesting diﬀerence is found in the double diﬀerence pattern:  the coeﬃ­
cient on ﬂoods is no longer signiﬁcant, and assumes a slightly positive or slightly negative 
value depending on the deﬁnition of village-level shock variables; the coeﬃcient on health 
shocks is highly positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This implies that house­
holds increased consumption when hit by shocks, which is contrary to expectation.  Across 
regions, the positive coeﬃcient on health shocks was most evident in Sindh (speciﬁcation (ii) 
in Appendix Table 2).  Moreover, since ﬂood damages were also concentrated in Sindh, the 
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on ﬂoods is also mostly due to the diﬀerence in the food consump­
tion dynamics in Sindh. After a more careful examination of the data, we have the following 
interpretation.21 
The positive coeﬃcient on health shocks and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on ﬂoods could be 
due to a change in preference toward food.  It is found that both health shocks and ﬂoods 
cause households to increase their budget share for food. Spending more on high-quality food 
for household members who have been injured and are seriously sick or taking more calories 
under exhaustive hygienic conditions when hit by ﬂoods appears to be rational behavior. It 
is likely that within-region and inter-village networks in rural Sindh may have contributed to 
the increase in food consumption in Sindh when villagers were hit by these disasters. Rural 
21Another possibility could be the problem in the imputation of own-produced food consumption. Especially 
regarding ﬂoods, the local shock may have risen the local price of foods, resulting in a seemingly increased 
food consumption expenditure even when food consumption quantity did not change or declined.  To check 
whether  this  is  a  serious  problem,  we  re-estimated  regressions  using  region-level  prices  in  imputation  or 
using subsample of households whose share of own-produced food consumption was low.  The results were 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 7. 
20Sindh is known for the existence of big landlords who are closely connected and the patron-
client relationships with such landlords at the top (Perera, 2003; Naqvi et al., 1989). In other 
words, landlord-based networks of patron-client relationships in Sindh could have served as 
such risk-sharing networks. Thus, the contrast between the total consumption dynamics and 
food consumption dynamics also suggests the existence of consumption smoothing through 
a kind of risk sharing across villages within a region. 
5  Conclusion 
This paper investigated the type of households in rural Pakistan that are vulnerable to natu­
ral disasters in terms of a decline in their consumption when their village was hit by natural 
disasters such as ﬂoods and droughts.  The regression results associating observed changes 
in  consumption  to  household  characteristics  and  village-level  disaster  variables  indicated 
the following results.  The sensitivity of consumption changes to village-level shocks diﬀer­
entiated by the characteristics of households is diﬀerent from that to idiosyncratic health 
shocks diﬀerentiated by similar characteristics.  It was found that more landed households 
and households with greater access to formal ﬁnancial institutions were less vulnerable to 
all these shocks.  On the other hand, households in which the household head is educated 
and elderly as well as households with a greater number of working members bore a larger 
burden of village-level shocks, while they were not vulnerable to idiosyncratic health shocks. 
The coexistence of unequal access to credit markets and risk sharing among heterogeneous 
households in terms of risk tolerance may be responsible for these patterns. 
There are several  possible extensions that could be attempted in the future with re­
gard to the impacts of village-level shocks.  First,  empirically distinguishing risk sharing, 
self-insurance, and the heterogenous impact of shocks on household income remains an im­
portant challenge. The evidence provided in this paper is only suggestive. Second, the actual 
mechanisms that enable intra-region and inter-village risk sharing must be identiﬁed.  From 
anthropology literature on the rural society in Pakistan, it may be indicated that landlord-
based networks of patron-client relationships are a possible mechanism. Since such networks 
are strongest in rural Sindh, this interpretation appears consistent with the regional contrast 
that Sindh villagers were protected against certain types of shocks but they suﬀered from 
the lowest average consumption level, while northern Punjab villagers enjoyed the highest 
average consumption level that was mostly self-insured. Third, the investigation of long-term 
welfare costs of natural disasters through (human) capital investment is highly recommended 
for further research. 
What are the implications of the ﬁndings of this paper for the Pakistani Floods of 2010? 
Our best estimate for the impact of ﬂoods is a 20–40% decline in consumption, which is a 
21substantial reduction considering the already low levels of initial consumption. Nevertheless, 
these estimates must be interpreted as the lower bound since they are based on ﬂood data 
where between-village variation in damages was large. When there were unprecedented ﬂoods 
all over the country and they have a similar eﬀect on a majority of the villages, risk coping 
across villages becomes highly diﬃcult due to disrupted communication and transportation, 
thereby resulting in a huge loss of welfare.  The contrast found in this paper with regard to 
the impact of droughts and ﬂoods on household consumption indicates this possibility in a 
qualitative manner. 
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Table 1. Average consumption, poverty, and inequality measures based on expenditures in Pakistan 
PRHS-I (2001)  PRHS-II (2004) 
1. Average welfare ratio 
Punjab and Sindh pooled (rural only)  1.465  1.846 
(0.029)  (0.038) 
By regions 
Northern Punjab  1.848  2.190 
(0.064)  (0.070) 
Southern Punjab  1.546  1.886 
(0.065)  (0.099) 
Sindh  1.175  1.617 
(0.028)  (0.043) 
2. Poverty Measures 
Punjab and Sindh pooled (rural only) 
Headcount index  0.372  0.259 
(0.014)  (0.013) 
Poverty gap index  0.0950  0.0680 
(0.0047)  (0.0043) 
Squared poverty gap index  0.0354  0.0260 
(0.0023)  (0.0022) 
Headcount index by regions 
Northern Punjab  0.196  0.154 
(0.020)  (0.019) 
Southern Punjab  0.361  0.267 
(0.026)  (0.024) 
Sindh  0.490  0.318 
(0.022)  (0.021) 
3. Atkinson inequality measures 
Punjab and Sindh pooled (rural only)  0.359  0.425 
(0.012)  (0.013) 
By regions 
Northern Punjab  0.336  0.394 
(0.019)  (0.022) 
Southern Punjab  0.359  0.461 
(0.027)  (0.032) 
Sindh  0.305  0.392 
(0.015)  (0.016) 
Notes: The inequality aversion parameter for Atkinson's inequality measure is set at 3. 
Conventional standard errors are reported in parenthesis for the average welfare ratio 
and poverty measures, while bootstrapped standard errors (the number of replications is 
500) are reported in parentheses for inequality measures. Statistics are weighted in 
order to make figures representative of individual-level summary statistics. 
Source: Calculated by the author from PRHS panel data (NOB=1,609). 
25Table 2. Household-level poverty transition in Pakistan from 2001 to 2004 
Status in PRHS-II (2004) 
Status in PRHS-I (2001)  Below z  Above z  Total 
Punjab and Sindh pooled (rural only) 
Number of sample households 
Below z  182  342  524 
Above z  176  909  1,085 
Total  358  1,251  1,609 
Transition probability (%) 
Below z  34.7  65.3  100.0 
Above z  16.2  83.8  100.0 
Northern Punjab 
Number of sample households 
Below z  27  58  85 
Above z  42  383  425 
Total  69  441  510 
Transition probability (%) 
Below z  31.8  68.2  100.0 
Above z  9.9  90.1  100.0 
Southern Punjab 
Number of sample households 
Below z  50  80  130 
Above z  47  242  289 
Total  97  322  419 
Transition probability (%) 
Below z  38.5  61.5  100.0 
Above z  16.3  83.7  100.0 
Sindh 
Number of sample households 
Below z  105  204  309 
Above z  87  284  371 
Total  192  488  680 
Transition probability (%) 
Below z  34.0  66.0  100.0 
Above z  23.5  76.5  100.0 
Note: "z " is the poverty line corresponding to the official one (see footnote 7). 
Source: Calculated by the author from PRHS panel data. 
26Table 3. Incidence of village-level production shocks in Pakistan 
Distribution of damage index* in Rabi  Distribution of damage index* in 
season (%)  Kharif season (%) 
0 1 2 3 4  0 1 2 3 4 
Drought in the last year (Kharif 2003 and Rabi 2003/04) 
Northern Punjab  47.1  7.1  9.5  36.3  0.0  47.9  7.1  12.9  32.2  0.0 
Southern Punjab  0.0  34.1  41.4  24.4  0.0  4.8  24.9  45.3  12.9  12.1 
Sindh  61.7  4.4  10.3  15.6  8.2  81.5  5.4  3.7  2.9  6.5 
Drought in the year before the last year (Kharif 2002 and Rabi 2002/03) 
Northern Punjab  54.4  7.1  6.4  32.2  0.0  50.8  7.1  3.0  35.7  3.3 
Southern Punjab  8.7  37.6  16.4  37.3  0.0  8.5  30.2  56.3  5.1  0.0 
Sindh  84.0  0.0  4.8  7.5  3.7  76.7  6.7  6.6  4.1  5.9 
Drought in Kharif 2001 and Rabi 2001/02 
Northern Punjab  50.8  7.1  3.0  35.7  3.3  47.7  7.1  9.5  35.7  0.0 
Southern Punjab  22.6  65.9  7.3  4.2  0.0  29.3  50.5  20.3  0.0  0.0 
Sindh  79.2  7.0  4.7  2.0  7.1  79.7  2.5  3.7  2.0  12.1 
Drought in Kharif 2000 and Rabi 2000/01 
Northern Punjab  85.0  0.0  0.0  15.0  0.0  85.0  0.0  0.0  15.0  0.0 
Southern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sindh  89.8  5.1  1.1  2.0  2.0  89.8  5.1  1.1  2.0  2.0 
Flood in the last year (Kharif 2003 and Rabi 2003/04) 
Northern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Southern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sindh  94.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.7  72.1  5.7  4.0  3.9  14.2 
Flood in the year before the last year (Kharif 2002 and Rabi 2002/03) 
Northern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Southern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  90.7  4.8  0.0  4.5  0.0 
Sindh  69.1  8.0  4.5  6.5  11.9  84.9  0.0  2.8  2.4  9.9 
Flood in Kharif 2001 and Rabi 2001/02 
Northern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Southern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  95.8  4.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sindh  87.1  0.0  0.0  5.1  7.7  91.2  0.0  2.3  1.1  5.4 
Flood in Kharif 2000 and Rabi 2000/01 
Northern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Southern Punjab  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sindh  98.9  0.0  0.0  1.1  0.0  98.9  0.0  0.0  1.1  0.0 
Source: Calculated by the author from PRHS panel data (NOB=1,609).
 
Note: * The index takes 0 (``No effect": no report for crop damage), 1 (``Little effect": yield loss up to 10%), 2
 
(``Moderate": 10-25% loss), 3 (``Severe": 25-50% loss), and 4 (``Disaster": over 50% loss). Since all of them are
 
mutually exclusive, the sum of the percentage is 100.0.
 
27Table 4. Summary statistics of empirical variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variable 
dlnc  Log difference of the welfare ratio between  0.175  0.611  -1.761  2.314 
PRHS-I and PRHS-II (consumption excluding 
durables, house rent, and medical expenditures). 
Explanatory variables: Household characteristics and idiosyncratic shocks 
landacre  Size of farmland owned by the household  4.947  11.679  0  102 
(acres). 
livslrg  Number of large livestock animals owned by  2.496  3.019  0  21 
the household. 
livssml  Number of sheep and goats owned by the  1.816  3.935  0  50 
household. 
assets  Value of assets (durable consumption goods,  20.000  56.992  0  2001 
transportation equipment, house buildings, etc.) 
owned by the household (Rs.1,000). 
nfe_perm  Number of male household members who were  0.239  0.561  0  5 
employed permanently by the private sector, 
government, or police. 
nfe_casl  Number of male household members who were  0.429  0.742  0  4 
employed in non-farm activities on daily or 
contract basis. 
remit  Dummy for a household that received  0.055  dummy  0  1 
remittances from family members living 
separately. 
cc_fml  Dummy for a household that was constrained to  0.682  dummy  0  1 
the formal credit access.# 
cc_inf  Dummy for a household that was constrained to  0.101  dummy  0  1 
the informal credit access.# 
head_age  Age of household head (years).  47.639  14.283  14  99 
head_sch  Education level of household head (completed  2.791  3.849  0  21 
years of schooling). 
head_fem  Dummy for a female-headed household.  0.018  dummy  0  1 
femratio  The ratio of females in the household size.  0.482  0.143  0  1 
depratio  The ratio of dependent members (aged <15 and  0.476  0.186  0  1 
>60) in the household size. 
popwt1  Household size (Nos.).  8.957  4.443  1  42 
health_shock  Dummy variable for the household whose  0.071  dummy  0  1 
members experienced a severe health shock 
during the two survey periods resulting in 
medical treatment. 
Explanatory variables: Village-level agricultural production shocks 
drought  Index variable* for crop damage due to drought  0.279  0.281  0  1 
in Rabi 04, Kharif 03, Rabi 03, and Kharif 02. 
flood  Index variable* for crop damage due to flood in  0.076  0.161  0  0.938 
Rabi 04, Kharif 03, Rabi 03, and Kharif 02. 
28Notes: (1) The subsample used in the regression analyses is those households whose welfare ratio was lower than 
four in both PRHS-I and PRHS-II and whose size changed by less than or equal to three persons during the two 
surveys. Due to this selection, the number of households in this table is at most 1,293 (1,290 for cc_fml and cc_inf, 
and 1,243 for head_sch), against 1,609 in Tables 1 and 2. 
(2) Means and standard deviations (Std.Dev.) are weighted by the household size in PRHS 1 in order to obtain 
individual-level summary statistics. 
(3) All household-level variables are taken from the PRHS-I dataset, except for "remit", which corresponds to the 
remittance receipts in the agricultural year of 2003/04. 
# Households were regarded as constrained if they needed to borrow from the formal (informal) sector and applied 
for a loan but rejected; or, if they needed to borrow from the formal (informal) sector but did not apply for the loan 
because the credit institutions are too far away, there is no guarantee available, no collateral, excessive procedures, 
etc. The corresponding period for formal loans is "ever until 2000/01" while that for informal loans is "during 
2000/01". 
* The sum of index variables for the four seasons in the last two years in Table 3 divided by 16. 
Source: Calculated by the author from PRHS panel data. 
29Table 5. Sensitivity of consumption changes to village-level production shocks in Pakistan 
Dependent variable: dlnc (change in log consumption) 
(ii) With cross-terms with  (i) Without cross-terms 
region dummies 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Region fixed effects 
intercept  0.0555  (0.1123)  0.0532  (0.1145) 
South.Punjab  -0.1097 **  (0.0474)  -0.2412 **  (0.1033) 
Sindh  0.2321 ***  (0.0508)  0.2544 ***  (0.0626) 
Household characteristics 
landacre  -0.0062 **  (0.0025)  -0.0058 **  (0.0024) 
livslrg  -0.0041  (0.0068)  -0.0030  (0.0068) 
livssml  -0.0126 **  (0.0063)  -0.0123 *  (0.0064) 
assets  0.0003  (0.0002)  0.0002  (0.0002) 
nfe_perm  0.0884 **  (0.0347)  0.0871 **  (0.0351) 
nfe_casl  0.0077  (0.0254)  0.0094  (0.0257) 
remit  0.1223 *  (0.0726)  0.1238 *  (0.0734) 
cc_fml  0.0394  (0.0418)  0.0372  (0.0420) 
cc_inf  0.0741  (0.0594)  0.0744  (0.0596) 
head_age  0.0016  (0.0013)  0.0015  (0.0013) 
head_sch  0.0032  (0.0051)  0.0027  (0.0051) 
head_fem  -0.0198  (0.1099)  -0.0140  (0.1122) 
femratio  -0.1597  (0.1230)  -0.1550  (0.1230) 
depratio  0.2561 ***  (0.0944)  0.2501 ***  (0.0947) 
popwt1  -0.0054  (0.0060)  -0.0059  (0.0060) 
Village-level shocks 
drought  -0.0081  (0.0655) 
drought*North.Punjab  0.0193  (0.0926) 
drought*South.Punjab  0.3164  (0.1970) 
drought*Sindh  -0.1428  (0.1069) 
flood  -0.4654 ***  (0.1410) 
flood*South.Punjab  -1.0140  (0.9604) 
flood*Sindh  -0.4286 ***  (0.1450) 
Idiosyncratic shocks 
health_shock  -0.0878  (0.0605) 
health_shock*North.Punjab  -0.1028  (0.1151) 
health_shock*South.Punjab  -0.0886  (0.0939) 
health_shock*Sindh  -0.0605  (0.0980) 
F-stat for zero slopes#  4.46 ***  3.76 *** 
F-stat for homogenous impact#  0.90 
R-squared  0.090  0.093 
Notes: NOB is 1,241 (several households whose "head_sch" was missing were excluded). Estimated by 
weighted least squares with household size as weights. Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis, with * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% statistical significance levels. 
# "F-stat for zero slopes" indicates the F statistics for the null hypothesis that the empirical model has no 
explanatory power. It is distributed as F(20,1220) for specification (i), F(25,1215) for specification (ii), 
F(41,1199) for specification (iii), and F(27,1213) for specification (iv), under the null. "F-stat for homogenous 
impact" indicates the F statistics for the null hypothesis of specification (i) against others. It is distributed as 
F(5,1215) for specification (ii), F(21,1199) for specification (iii), and F(7,1213) for specification (iv), under 
the null. 
Source: Estimated by the author from PRHS panel data. 
30Table 5. Sensitivity of consumption changes to village-level production shocks in Pakistan (cont'd) 
Dependent variable: dlnc (change in log consumption) 
(iii) With all cross terms with  (iv) Parsimonious 
households' initial attributes  specification 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Region fixed effects  (Yes)  (Yes) 
Household characteristics  (Yes)  (Yes) 
Village-level shocks and their cross-terms with household characteristics 
drought  0.0986  (0.2936)  -0.4132 **  (0.1686)
 
drought*landacre  0.0119  (0.0075)  0.0139 **  (0.0069)
 
drought*nfe_perm  -0.0187  (0.1232)
 
drought*remit  -0.3490  (0.2627)
 
drought*cc_fml  -0.1979  (0.1435)
 
drought*head_age  -0.0060  (0.0043)
 
drought*head_sch  -0.0036  (0.0179)
 
drought*depratio  0.5984 *  (0.3205)  0.7181 **  (0.3182)
 
flood  1.0307 **  (0.4614)  0.6296  (0.4108)
 
flood*landacre  0.0141  (0.0095)  0.0153 *  (0.0089)
 
flood*nfe_perm  0.1142  (0.3229)
 
flood*remit  0.1280  (0.7966)
 
flood*cc_fml  -0.1298  (0.2358)
 
flood*head_age  -0.0270 ***  (0.0090)  -0.0246 ***  (0.0087)
 
flood*head_sch  -0.0393 *  (0.0227)  -0.0404 *  (0.0223)
 
flood*depratio  -0.4542  (0.5199)
 
Idiosyncratic shocks and their cross-terms with household characteristics 
health_shock  0.0330  (0.2352)  0.0363  (0.0759) 
health_shock*landacre  0.0109 **  (0.0051)  0.0111 **  (0.0050) 
health_shock*nfe_perm  -0.1484  (0.0990)  (0.0834) 
health_shock*remit  0.1932  (0.2002) 
health_shock*cc_fml  -0.2822 ***  (0.1066)  -0.2773 ***  (0.1004) 
health_shock*head_age  0.0000  (0.0032) 
health_shock*head_sch  0.0164  (0.0127) 
health_shock*depratio  -0.0191  (0.2963) 
F-stat for zero slopes#  3.80 ***  4.84 *** 
F-stat for homogenous impact#  2.49 ***  5.03 *** 
R-squared  0.120  0.113 
31Table 6. Robustness check with respect to the definition of production shock variables 
Default#  Alternative (1)  Alternative (2) 
Production shock Production shock 
variables corresponding variables corresponding  Production shock
to the larger of the last to the average of the last  variables corresponding
two years (Kharif 2002 two years (Kharif 2002,  to the last year (Kharif
and Rabi 2002/03, or, Rabi 2002/03, Kharif  2003 and Rabi 2003/04)
Kharif 2003 and Rabi 2003, and Rabi 2003/04) 
2003/04) 
(i) Without cross-terms 
drought  -0.0081  (0.0655)  -0.0017  (0.0596)  -0.0963  (0.0605) 
flood  -0.4654 ***  (0.1410)  -0.3789 ***  (0.0839)  -0.2167 **  (0.1087) 
health_shock  -0.0878  (0.0605)  -0.0890  (0.0601)  -0.0799  (0.0606) 
(ii) With cross terms with households' initial attributes, parsimonious 
drought*landacre  0.0139 **  (0.0069)  0.0128 **  (0.0054) 
drought*cc_fml  -0.2358 *  (0.1269) 
drought*depratio  0.7181 **  (0.3182)  0.6309 **  (0.2914)  0.5174 *  (0.3010) 
flood*landacre  0.0153 *  (0.0089) 
flood*head_age  -0.0246 ***  (0.0087)  -0.0132 **  (0.0065) 
flood*head_sch  -0.0404 *  (0.0223)  -0.0281 *  (0.0159)  -0.0485 ***  (0.0185) 
health_shock*landacre  0.0111 **  (0.0050)  0.0102 *  (0.0053) 
health_shock*cc_fml  -0.2773 ***  (0.1004)  -0.2758 ***  (0.1022)  -0.3188 ***  (0.1043) 
Notes: See Table 5 for the estimation methodology, number of observations, and list of explanatory variables not 
reported in this table. The mean (standard deviation) of the alternative shock variables are: Alternative (1), drought 
0.332 (0.312), flood 0.119 (0.258); Alternative (2), drought 0.306 (0.304), flood 0.060 (0.189). 
# Specification (i) is subtracted from (i) in Table 5, and specification (ii) is subtracted from (iv) in Table 5. 
32Table 7. Sensitivity of food consumption changes to village-level production shocks in Pakistan 
Dependent variable: dlncf (change in log food consumption) 
Production shock=Default  =Alternative (1)  =Alternative (2) 
(i) Without cross-terms 
drought  0.0192  (0.0653)  0.0236  (0.0601)  -0.0134  (0.0619) 
flood  -0.0089  (0.1396)  -0.1064  (0.0856)  0.1287  (0.1092) 
health_shock  0.1380 **  (0.0593)  0.1309 **  (0.0589)  0.1451 **  (0.0593) 
(ii) With cross terms with households' initial attributes, parsimonious 
drought*landacre  0.0119 *  (0.0065)  0.0123 ***  (0.0047) 
drought*head_age  -0.0120 ***  (0.0043)  -0.0087 **  (0.0039)  -0.0095 **  (0.0041) 
flood*landacre  0.0200 **  (0.0079)  0.0161 ***  (0.0058)  0.0134 **  (0.0055) 
flood*head_age  -0.0270 ***  (0.0083)  -0.0135 ***  (0.0049)  -0.0192 ***  (0.0063) 
flood*depratio  -0.7853 *  (0.4697) 
health_shock*landacre  0.0100 **  (0.0040)  0.0106 ***  (0.0036)  0.0099 **  (0.0040) 
health_shock*cc_fml  -0.1936 *  (0.1096)  -0.1946 *  (0.1100) 
Notes: See Table 5 for the estimation methodology, number of observations, and list of explanatory variables not 
reported in this table. The mean (standard deviation) of the dependent variable 0.176 (0.635). 
33Appendix Table 1. Robustness check with respect to the exclusion of idiosyncratic shock variables 
Dependent variable: dlnc (change in log consumption) 
Production shock=Default  =Alternative (1)  =Alternative (2) 
(i) Without cross-terms 
drought  -0.0086  (0.0656)  -0.0025  (0.0597)  -0.0965  (0.0606) 
flood  -0.4524 ***  (0.1402)  -0.3722 ***  (0.0835)  -0.2069 *  (0.1082) 
(ii) With cross terms with households' initial attributes, parsimonious 
drought*landacre  0.0130 *  (0.0071)  0.0122 **  (0.0056) 
drought*cc_fml  -0.2385 *  (0.1271) 
drought*depratio  0.7083 **  (0.3179)  0.6256 **  (0.2915)  0.5374 *  (0.3018) 
flood*landacre  0.0153 *  (0.0090) 
flood*head_age  -0.0244 ***  (0.0086)  -0.0131 **  (0.0065) 
flood*head_sch  -0.0421 *  (0.0222)  -0.0290 *  (0.0158)  -0.0488 ***  (0.0184) 
Notes: See Table 5 for the estimation methodology, number of observations, and list of explanatory variables not 
reported in this table. All specifications exclude the terms associated with variable health_shock  from the list of 
explanatory variables. 
34Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity of food consumption changes to village-level production shocks 
Dependent variable: dlncf (change in log food consumption) 
(ii) With cross-terms with  (i) Without cross-terms 
region dummies 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Region fixed effects 
intercept  0.0071  (0.1151)  0.0054  (0.1157) 
South.Punjab  -0.1616 ***  (0.0476)  -0.2989 ***  (0.1047) 
Sindh  0.1969 ***  (0.0520)  0.1648 ***  (0.0627) 
Household characteristics 
landacre  -0.0074 ***  (0.0025)  -0.0070 ***  (0.0024) 
livslrg  -0.0036  (0.0069)  -0.0015  (0.0067) 
livssml  -0.0159 ***  (0.0056)  -0.0149 ***  (0.0056) 
assets  0.0002  (0.0002)  0.0002  (0.0002) 
nfe_perm  0.0694 **  (0.0346)  0.0688 **  (0.0346) 
nfe_casl  -0.0088  (0.0277)  -0.0018  (0.0282) 
remit  0.0621  (0.0645)  0.0609  (0.0628) 
cc_fml  0.0110  (0.0412)  0.0165  (0.0408) 
cc_inf  0.0423  (0.0605)  0.0324  (0.0597) 
head_age  0.0011  (0.0014)  0.0009  (0.0014) 
head_sch  0.0041  (0.0055)  0.0039  (0.0056) 
head_fem  0.0504  (0.0969)  0.0471  (0.0975) 
femratio  -0.0739  (0.1264)  -0.0562  (0.1261) 
depratio  0.2319 **  (0.0980)  0.2422 **  (0.0974) 
popwt1  0.0012  (0.0066)  0.0000  (0.0064) 
Village-level shocks 
drought  0.0192  (0.0653) 
drought*North.Punjab  0.0220  (0.0822) 
drought*South.Punjab  0.4071 **  (0.2019) 
drought*Sindh  -0.1023  (0.1175) 
flood  -0.0089  (0.1396) 
flood*South.Punjab  -1.9646 **  (0.8922) 
flood*Sindh  0.1109  (0.1429) 
Idiosyncratic shocks 
health_shock  0.1380 **  (0.0593) 
health_shock*North.Punjab  0.0059  (0.0895) 
health_shock*South.Punjab  -0.0567  (0.0939) 
health_shock*Sindh  0.3360 ***  (0.0936) 
F-stat for zero slopes#  4.47 ***  4.56 *** 
F-stat for homogenous impact#  2.89 ** 
R-squared  0.090  0.104 
Notes: See Table 5. 
35Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity of food consumption changes to village-level production shocks (cont'd) 
Dependent variable: dlncf (change in log food consumption) 
(iii) With all cross terms with  (iv) Parsimonious 
households' initial attributes  specification 
Explanatory variables  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Region fixed effects  (Yes)  (Yes) 
Household characteristics  (Yes)  (Yes) 
Village-level shocks and their cross-terms with household characteristics 
drought  0.5372 *  (0.3043)  0.5340 **  (0.2239)
 
drought*landacre  0.0108  (0.0072)  0.0119 *  (0.0065)
 
drought*nfe_perm  -0.1096  (0.1160)
 
drought*remit  -0.1531  (0.1908)
 
drought*cc_fml  -0.1646  (0.1365)
 
drought*head_age  -0.0107 **  (0.0044)  -0.0120 ***  (0.0043)
 
drought*head_sch  -0.0140  (0.0183)
 
drought*depratio  0.2727  (0.3374)
 
flood  1.1117 **  (0.4582)  1.0508 ***  (0.3848)
 
flood*landacre  0.0229 ***  (0.0077)  0.0200 **  (0.0079)
 
flood*nfe_perm  0.0939  (0.3303)
 
flood*remit  0.2208  (0.5739)
 
flood*cc_fml  0.3851  (0.2391)
 
flood*head_age  -0.0287 ***  (0.0088)  -0.0270 ***  (0.0083)
 
flood*head_sch  -0.0061  (0.0257)
 
flood*depratio  -0.4197  (0.5517)
 
Idiosyncratic shocks and their cross-terms with household characteristics 
health_shock  0.1480  (0.2528)  0.2022 **  (0.0882) 
health_shock*landacre  0.0113 ***  (0.0040)  0.0100 **  (0.0040) 
health_shock*nfe_perm  -0.0004  (0.0987)  (0.0834) 
health_shock*remit  0.1173  (0.1343) 
health_shock*cc_fml  -0.1164  (0.1120)  -0.1936 *  (0.1096) 
health_shock*head_age  -0.0012  (0.0034) 
health_shock*head_sch  0.0241  (0.0166) 
health_shock*depratio  -0.0554  (0.3315) 
F-stat for zero slopes#  4.20 ***  5.25 *** 
F-stat for homogenous impact#  2.28 ***  5.64 *** 
R-squared  0.120  0.112 
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